Governor Raj: Choking Indian Democracy
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APRIL 2025
When unelected Governors, delay laws passed by elected Assemblies, democracy doesn’t just slow down—it suffocates.
Recent events in India have once again laid bare the frictions within its federal framework — particularly the strained role of the Governor, an office originally envisioned as a neutral constitutional authority but increasingly seen as a political instrument.
Democracy, by its very design, rests on a system of checks and balances, where elected representatives legislate, and unelected constitutional functionaries serve in supportive, facilitative roles.
However, the Supreme Court of India, in a scathing indictment of Tamil Nadu Governor RN Ravi, drew attention to one such erosion.
The Governor of Tamil Nadu had withheld action on ten key Bills passed by the State legislature — not for weeks, but for years, that too without offering constitutionally mandated reasons.
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Recent events in India have once again laid bare the frictions within its federal framework...
This deliberate delay, and the eventual referral of these Bills to the President immediately after they were repassed by the Assembly.
The reason for this knee-jerk reaction was when the matter came under judicial scrutiny.
It marked yet another blatant insult to the spirit of representative governance.
At the heart of the issue lies Article 200 of the Indian Constitution, which empowers Governors
• to assent,
• withhold assent or
• reserve Bills for Presidential consideration.
Importantly, the constitution mandates that this decision be taken "as soon as possible."
The framers of the Constitution, wary of these autocratic tendencies, included this clause to ensure that Governors would not function as political roadblocks.
Yet, the conduct of the Tamil Nadu Governor represents what the Supreme Court described as a "pocket veto" — an indefinite, silent, and unaccountable hold on the will of the people.
The Supreme Court's intervention was historic not merely in its substance but in its tone.
Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan went beyond legal interpretation to issue a principled critique of the Governor’s role.
The Court described the Governor's conduct as “erroneous in law, arbitrary, and nonest” — in other words, constitutionally void.
It asserted that Governors are not sovereigns or monarchs, but constitutional functionaries who must act on the aid and advice of the elected State Cabinet.
Importantly, the Court imposed a judicially enforceable time limit of one to three months on Governors to act on Bills.
It is a necessary innovation to prevent misuse of this constitutional post, and applicable to all state governments across India.
The Governor’s decision to withhold assent without explanation, and then to refer the Bills to the President at the eleventh hour, undermined not just the Tamil Nadu Assembly, but the very idea of legislative sovereignty in a democracy.
Worse, the President compounded the issue by giving assent to one Bill, rejecting seven, and ignoring two altogether.
The Court found itself with no other choice than to invoke its extraordinary powers under Article 142, to rightly deemed all 10 Bills as having received assent.
Symbolically this action of the Supreme Court restored the authority of the State legislature.
This latest episode exposes a larger, systemic concern of the increasing politicisation of Governors, especially in Opposition-ruled states.
In Delhi, where the matter of Lt. Governor and Delhi government reached the Court in 2023, it ruled that elected governments must have control over civil services, except in matters of police, land, and public order.
In effect the court curbed LG’s overreach.
Appointed by the Union government, Governors are expected to be impartial custodians of the Constitution.
However, in practice, they are increasingly behaving like agents of the Centre, stalling progressive legislation in states not aligned with the ruling party at the national level.
Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, West Bengal, Delhi and Maharashtra have all experienced this democratic subversion in some form, where laws passed by duly elected state legislatures are kept in limbo, sabotaging governance and delaying reforms.
Governors have, in effect, become unaccountable veto points in the democratic chain.
Ironically, they are accountable neither to the people, nor to the legislature, in a democratic framework, making them the weakest link.
It is particularly dangerous in a federal polity, where decentralisation and respect for state autonomy are foundational.
The misuse of constitutional discretion by Governors compromises not just state governance but also public faith in democratic institutions.
The latest episode of the Tamil Nadu governor along with others in the others, highlight an underlying concern that India's democratic structure, while robust in appearance, is increasingly vulnerable to authoritarian centralisation.
The consequence of the governor and government conflict lead up to following:
• Delay in assent to Bills, sometimes indefinitely.
• Blocking or delaying administrative functions and appointments.
• Acting as political spokespersons, publicly criticizing elected governments.
• Withholding or refusing to convene legislative sessions.
• Undermining state autonomy in university governance, appointments, and reforms.
It is an underrated crisis that raises alarms for the health of the Indian democracy.
When the neutrality of the Governor's office is eroded, turning it into a tool for central political control it only dilutes the spirit of cooperative federalism.
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At the heart of the issue lies Article 200 of the Indian Constitution...
Central government’s control of the state, through Governors distorts the balance of power between Centre and States.
Recurrent misuse or politicisation of the Governor’s position jeopardises the foundational principle of federalism.
Paradoxically, an unelected appointees can override or stall the mandate of the people in world’s largest democracy.
When such paralysis is used as a political strategy, Indian democracy is not merely weakened, it is weaponised.
Remedy
1. Codification of Timelines and Procedures
The Supreme Court’s directive to impose a 1–3 month timeline for Governors to act on Bills under Article 200 is a welcome step.
But this must be codified into law or constitutional amendment, preventing future ambiguity or misuse. The phrase “as soon as possible” cannot remain open-ended.
2. Redefining the Role of Governors
There is a pressing need to revisit the appointment process of Governors. Currently, they are selected at the discretion of the Centre, without consultation with the state.
A bipartisan consultative mechanism, involving the Chief Minister or a panel of state representatives, can ensure neutrality and trust.
3. Establishing a Constitutional Ombudsman
A permanent body, perhaps under the aegis of the Inter-State Council should be empowered to review complaints against Governors, especially when there is a prima facie breach of constitutional duty.
4. Empowering State Assemblies and High Courts
State legislatures should be granted greater procedural tools to demand accountability.
High Courts, as constitutional courts within the states, should be empowered to fast-track cases involving gubernatorial overreach, rather than waiting for Supreme Court intervention.
5. Political Maturity and Morality
No legal or institutional mechanism can substitute for constitutional morality.
Political parties, especially those in power at the Centre, must resist the temptation to use Governors as partisan agents. Federalism is not a threat to national unity—it is its strongest guarantee.
The Supreme Court has, for now, upheld the spirit of the Constitution.
But its judgment is a reminder that even in a democracy, power without accountability remains a persistent threat.
India’s federal fabric, if it is to endure, must not just be stitched with laws, it must be protected by political culture, constitutional morality, and a vigilant citizenry.
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The Court found itself with no other choice than to invoke its extraordinary powers under Article 142...
Until then, democracy will remain a fragile dream, too often obstructed by those entrusted with its guardianship.
More .... >>>
The Governor Vs Government conflict is not new in the Indian polity. Here are the iconic instances since 1980s.
1980s
Andhra Pradesh (1984) – Dismissal of N.T. Rama Rao Government
• Crisis: Governor Thakur Ram Lal dismissed N.T. Rama Rao (NTR), despite his majority, while he was away for medical treatment, and installed a Congress loyalist.
• Outcome: Massive public outcry; NTR was reinstated within a month. This became a textbook case of Governor's political misuse.
Jammu & Kashmir (1984) – Farooq Abdullah Dismissed
• Crisis: Governor Jagmohan dismissed CM Farooq Abdullah after alleged defections and installed a breakaway faction.
• Outcome: Viewed as Centre’s political interference, worsening Centre–Kashmir relations.
Karnataka (1989) – Denial of Chief Ministership to Ramakrishna Hegde
• Crisis: Despite support within Janata Dal, Governor S.L. Khurana did not invite Hegde to form government.
• Outcome: Sparked accusations of arbitrary gubernatorial discretion.
1990s
Uttar Pradesh (1996) – Kalyan Singh Denied Chance to Form Government
• Crisis: BJP was the single largest party but Governor Romesh Bhandari invited the Congress-BSP alliance instead.
• Outcome: The Governor’s impartiality was questioned, highlighting political calculations overriding constitutional norms.
Bihar (1995–99) – Conflict with Governor A.R. Kidwai
• Crisis: Governor A.R. Kidwai was often accused of blocking decisions of CM Lalu Prasad Yadav during the peak of his political dominance.
• Outcome: Marked a period of constant friction between Raj Bhavan and the state government.
Tamil Nadu (1991) – Dismissal of DMK Government
• Crisis: Governor Surjit Singh Barnala dismissed the DMK government after Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, citing deterioration of law and order.
• Outcome: Widely criticised as politically motivated, seen as retribution by the Centre.
2000s
Bihar (2005) – Dissolution of Assembly by Governor Buta Singh
• Crisis: Assembly dissolved on the Governor’s recommendation to prevent the NDA from forming a government, despite emerging majority support.
• Outcome: Supreme Court ruled the action unconstitutional. A landmark judgment on misuse of Article 356.
Goa (2007) – Controversial Dismissal of Government
• Crisis: Governor S.C. Jamir dismissed the Congress-led government under CM Digambar Kamat after a dispute over majority.
• Outcome: Legal and political chaos; exposed ambiguities in floor tests and majority claims.
Jharkhand (2005) – Shibu Soren’s Controversial Appointment
• Crisis: Governor Syed Sibtey Razi invited Shibu Soren (JMM) to form government, even though BJP-JD(U) alliance had the numbers.
• Outcome: Supreme Court ordered an immediate floor test. Soren lost and had to resign.
Arunachal Pradesh (2006 & 2009) – Political Instability and Governor’s Role
• Crisis: Series of political crises saw Governors play an active role in recommending President’s Rule, raising questions on neutrality.
• Outcome: Led to accusations of Raj Bhavan overreach in fragile Northeast politics.
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