Population Vs Progress: Lines That Threaten Indian Unity
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APRIL 2025
Looming Delimitation Crisis
There are few issues as consequential to the future of Indian democracy as the upcoming delimitation of parliamentary constituencies.
Yet, it remains largely absent from the national conversation—overshadowed by political expediency, administrative delays, and a lack of public engagement.
Delimitation, the redrawing of electoral boundaries based on the latest population data, is a routine feature of functioning democracies.
It is meant to ensure equitable representation as populations shift and grow.
In India, this exercise should ideally occur after every decennial census. But it hasn’t—not in any meaningful way—since 1976, when a constitutional amendment froze the process to encourage population control.
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In India, this exercise should ideally occur after every decennial census
That freeze was extended in 2001, pushing the next scheduled delimitation to 2026, contingent upon data from the 2021 census.
That census, however, was never conducted—first delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and then quietly shelved, with 2024 elections looming.
In the absence of current population data, any attempt to initiate delimitation would lack both statistical legitimacy and moral authority.
But postponement is not without consequence.
India today faces a gross imbalance in parliamentary representation.
Example - Sikkim, a small northeastern state with a population of around 650,000 sends one Member of Parliament (MP) to the Lok Sabha—the same as Bhopal, a single city in central India with over 25 lakh (2.5 million) residents.
Across the country, the ratio between constituents and their representatives varies wildly, placing tremendous strain on MPs from more populous regions, and distorting the principle of equal suffrage.
Yet the very mention of delimitation sends tremors through the federal structure of the Republic.
The core fear is this: that India’s southern states—Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka—will lose significant representation in Parliament, while northern states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar will gain.
This is not a speculative concern; it is a statistical inevitability.
Over the past four decades, southern India has made substantial progress on education, health, and family planning.
Total Fertility rate and Replacement Level (TFR) in the south India, now average around 1.8—below replacement level.
In contrast, northern states continue to report rates (TFR) closer to 3.0.
Uttar Pradesh’s population alone has swelled from 8 Crore (80 million) in 1976 to over 23 Crore (230 million) today. Meanwhile, states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu have barely doubled their numbers.
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...the ratio between constituents and their representatives varies wildly, placing tremendous strain on MPs...
If parliamentary seats are reallocated based solely on population, the south stands to lose—dramatically.
Estimates suggest Tamil Nadu could lose as many as nine seats, Andhra Pradesh three, and Kerala up to one-third of its representation in the parliament.
Karnataka may also lose two seats.
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, on the other hand, could double theirs over the next two decades.
This would amount to a profound injustice: punishing states that succeeded in stabilising population growth, while rewarding those that failed to curb it.
The injustice is not merely political, but also economic.
Southern states now contribute disproportionately to India's tax revenues. Highly literate and industrialised, they account for nearly 28% of the national budget.
Yet, under the current redistribution mechanisms, much of this revenue is transferred to less developed northern states.
If the south also loses parliamentary clout, it will be footing the bill without a voice at the table.
This imbalance is not just numerical—it is constitutional.
India’s federal structure is built on the principle of cooperative federalism, where states have autonomy but work in tandem with the Centre. However, trust in this balance is eroding.
The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which draws its political strength primarily from the Hindi-speaking northern belt, stands to benefit the most from delimitation.
With the central government increasingly accused of interfering in state matters—from three language policy to fiscal allocations to discontent related to matters in concurrent list—the anxiety among regional parties is only intensifying.
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This imbalance is not just numerical—it is constitutional
While Articles 81 and 82 of the Indian Constitution provide for an independent Delimitation Commission, backed by the Election Commission and the Supreme Court, the erosion of public trust in these institutions adds a layer of doubt.
Neutrality, once taken for granted, now feels precarious, after recent developments about voter list during recent elections in Delhi, Maharashtra and Harayana.
If the delimitation proceeds based solely on population, even a political sweep of the entire south by a single party would result in barely 9% of seats in Parliament.
This isn't just a representation gap—it's a democratic fracture of Indian polity.
Historically, such inequities are not unfamiliar.
Under British colonial rule, India’s wealthier provinces were plundered to serve a distant, smaller but controlling population in Britain.
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This isn't just a representation gap—it's a democratic fracture of Indian polity
A similar dynamic is now playing out in India: economically successful yet less populous southern states subsidising the rest, while simultaneously losing political agency.
The spectre of a north-south divide looms large. Language, culture, and governance models differ sharply across regions.
If delimitation deepens this rift, the consequences for national unity could be grave.
So what is the path forward?
First, a fresh and credible census must be conducted before any delimitation can begin. Anything less would lack democratic legitimacy.
Second, India must rethink its metrics for representation.
Should population alone determine parliamentary power? Or should economic contribution, governance outcomes, and developmental indices also play a role?
Therefore these tough questions must be asked:
Is our current model of democracy punishing progress and rewarding dysfunction?
Is the linguistic and cultural identity of Indian states under threat, due to looming delimitation?
Can we afford to let delimitation become a tool for political dominance rather than democratic equity?
It is imperative that this conversation expands beyond political discussions. Economists, jurists, civil society groups, and citizens alike must be part of the debate.
Delimitation may be a constitutional process, but its consequences are deeply political—and profoundly personal.
India’s diversity has always been its strength. Preserving that requires more than token gestures.
It demands fairness. It demands foresight. And above all, it demands a democracy that does not ask its most successful regions to pay the price for doing things right.
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Total fertility rate (TFR): The number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fertility rates currently observed.
Replacement Level: A TFR of 2.1 is considered the replacement level, where each generation replaces itself without significant population growth or decline.
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Key Features of the Delimitation Commission:
1. Constitutional Basis:
o The legal authority for delimitation comes from Article 82 of the Constitution and the Delimitation Acts passed by Parliament (e.g., Delimitation Act of 2002).
2. Independent Body:
o The Delimitation Commission is a statutory body, meaning it is independent of the executive and functions autonomously.
3. Composition: The Delimitation Commission typically consists of:
o A retired judge of the Supreme Court (as the Chairperson),
o The Chief Election Commissioner of India (ex-officio member),
o The respective State Election Commissioners of the states concerned (ex-officio members).
4. Appointed By:
o The President of India appoints the Commission under the Delimitation Act, as passed by Parliament.
5. Binding Nature:
o The Commission’s orders have the force of law and cannot be challenged in any court.
o Even Parliament and State Legislatures cannot modify or reject its decisions.
6. Function:
o It redraws the boundaries of parliamentary and assembly constituencies to reflect changes in population (based on the latest census).
o It also adjusts seat allocations to states, if necessary.
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India’s diversity has always been its strength. Preserving that requires more than token gestures
Last Delimitation Commission:
The last Commission was formed in 2002, chaired by Justice Kuldip Singh, based on the 2001 census.
However, due to the freeze on seat allocation (extended until 2026), it only redrew boundaries without changing the number of seats per state.
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